

Quarterly Management Report

Investment Window

Reporting Period: January to March 2022

May 2022

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AFN	Afghani(s) (currency)
AGASP	Afghanistan Gas Project
ALASP	Afghanistan Land Administration Project
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CASA 1000	Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project
CASA CSP	CASA Community Support Project
CCAP	Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project
CDC	Community Development Councils
CIP	Cities Investment Program
COVID-19 ERHSPP	COVID-19 Emergency Response and Health Systems Preparedness Project
DAB	Da Afghanistan Bank
EQRA	Education Quality Reform in Afghanistan
EZ-Kar	Eshteghal Zaiee - Karmondena
EZ-Kar-KM	Eshteghal Zaiee - Karmondena - Kabul Municipality
FP(s)	Facilitating Partner(s)
HEP	Herat Electrification Project
ICA	Internal Control Assessment
IDA	International Development Association
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NGO	Non-governmental organization
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
PIU(s)	Project Implementation Unit(s)
REACH	Relief Activities for Afghan Communities and Household Project
SoE(s)	Statement(s) of Expenditure
SP(s)	Service Provider(s)
TAGHIR	Tackling Afghanistan's Government Human Resource Management & Institutional Reforms
TPMA	Third Party Monitoring Agent
USD	United States Dollar(s) (currency)
WEE-RDP	Women's Economic Empowerment Rural Development Project

1 Overview of Activities and Key Findings

This report presents findings from physical and financial monitoring conducted by us between January and March 2022 (Q1 2022) in our capacity as Third-Party Monitoring Agent (TPMA) for World Bank-funded investment projects in Afghanistan.

In this period, we held discussions with the World Bank Infrastructure Team to identify third-party monitoring needs on infrastructure projects, following the pause of project monitoring on 15 August 2021 and subsequent suspension of ARTF and other trust fund grants in the portfolio, in response to the fall of the Afghan Government and subsequent Taliban takeover. The TPMA commenced ad hoc physical monitoring activities for two projects this quarter, completing data collection in March for the Central Asia-South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA 1000) and in April for the Naghlu Hydropower Rehabilitation Project. In addition to standard investment project monitoring, we conducted weekly site visits to monitor a range of economic sector indicators, including Consumer Price Index information on a basket of primary goods. We also continued remote financial monitoring activities, including reviews of non-governmental organization (NGO) invoices, Statement of Expenditure (SoE) reviews, and Internal Control Assessments (ICAs).

The following summary section provides an overview of our approach to project and financial monitoring activities. Figure 1 presents the number of site visits conducted in Q1 2022 disaggregated by monitoring activity and province.¹ Figure 2 shows the number of interviews conducted. The infrastructure project monitoring section includes key findings for the quarter from CASA 1000 only, since we completed data collection in March. This section is followed by a more detailed overview of our financial monitoring activities, and the findings from our Economic Sector Monitoring.

¹ Sub-projects are activities undertaken at local level.

Figure 1: Map of Third-Party Monitoring Activities in Q1 2022





Figure 2: Third-Party Monitoring Q1 2022 Interviews for Project and Sector Monitoring



1.1 Infrastructure Project Monitoring

Our infrastructure project monitoring activities are conducted based on requests from World Bank project teams. In Q1 2022, we monitored one investment project (CASA 1000),² undertaking 166³ site visits to 7 provinces, but not conducting interviews. We were unable to visit one site, in Paryan district, Panjshir, as a result of heavy snow blocking access.

In Q1 2022, we continued to revise and refine data collection tools in partnership with the World Bank to address any identified gaps.

1.1.1 Project Scores and Ratings

We scored and provided a rating for each sub-project using the system detailed in Annex 1. The scores were based primarily on engineers' assessments of infrastructure, including the quality of design, materials used, and workmanship. In the case of completed or near-completed work, the likely effectiveness of any Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Plan was also assessed. These scores were then

² We completed data collection for CASA 1000 in March 2022 and analysis is currently ongoing. We will report results in the IW Q2 2022 report.

³ All 166 site visits involved visits to multiple sub-projects.

adjusted to account for the number and severity of any unauthorized changes, shortcomings, or faults found (referred to as ‘deviations’ in our reporting).

These adjusted scores for individual sub-projects were then converted into ratings, from Very Good to Very Poor, and aggregated to produce a project rating. Preliminary analysis of the data collected for CASA 1000 indicates that it is rated ‘Good’. More detailed findings will be reported next quarter, once our analysis is complete.

1.1.2 Deviations

When conducting site visits, our engineers assess infrastructure progress and the quality of work undertaken, recorded in the form of ‘Observations’. Some of these are reported as ‘deviations’, classed as Critical, Major, or Minor. In short, a Critical deviation is one which, if not rectified, could lead to injury or death for current workers or future users or to failure of the sub-project as a whole; a Major deviation is one that is not life-threatening but affects the structural integrity or overall sustainability of the sub-project; and a Minor deviation is often a cosmetic deviation not affecting structural integrity, usability, or sustainability. Minor deviations can often be corrected with little effort and at limited cost. See Annex 1 for details.

For each deviation, our engineers make an on-site estimate of the cost of rectification, which is then reviewed for quality by the Financial Monitoring team. These estimates are not based on a market exercise for the local or transported cost of labor and materials but are provided to help project teams and government partners make informed decisions about how to rectify deviations. Therefore, they should not be interpreted as a final determination of value.

Table 1: Deviations Identified in Q1 2022

PROJECT	OBSERVATIONS	CRITICAL	MAJOR	MINOR	TOTAL DEVIATIONS	DEVIATIONS AS % OF TOTAL OBSERVATIONS	ESTIMATED COST OF RECTIFICATION (USD)
CASA 1000	4,767	1	11	76	88	2	\$12,655

Before 15 August 2021, project teams and Government partners were notified of all deviations via a dedicated online Digital Platform. This allowed deviations to be allocated to provincial project teams for rectification. Additionally, we held regular meetings with project teams from implementing ministries to follow up on actions taken. This approach ended after 15 August 2021.

As agreed with the World Bank and project teams, Minor deviations with an estimated rectification cost of under USD 50 are classified as ‘Notifications’. We did not identify any notifications for CASA 1000 in this quarter.

1.1.3 Rectifications of Deviations

Before August 2021, we worked closely with Project Implementation Units (PIUs) in different ministries to rectify deviations identified during site visits, with each deviation allocated to nominated Points of Contact from engineering teams within the respective PIUs. These Points of Contact reviewed each deviation and assigned them to district engineers, who reviewed them and worked to rectify the deviation found.

Each step was reflected in status changes on the Digital Platform so that both Points of Contact and our own staff could track progress and verify rectifications made.

We suspended the rectification process in September 2021, although the deviation and rectification data remain available and the process can be resumed as and when needed.

1.1.4 Good Practice and Extra Works

In Q3 2021, we made adjustments to separate evidence of Good Practice—that is, individual elements of work undertaken to a high standard—from that of Extra Works, or additional tasks undertaken to an appropriate standard but at no additional time or cost to the project. These changes reflected the fact that some communities can mobilize resources to carry out work beyond the scope of the original contract or design. In Q1 2022, we identified 1,027 examples of Good Practice and no examples of Extra Works. Examples of Good Practice related to various elements of transmission towers, including workmanship and fitting, size and shape, and materials, and to establishing tower foundations.

1.2 Financial Monitoring

Financial Monitoring during the quarter focused on project closure activities to assist the Bank in quantifying its outstanding liabilities and facilitate payments in respect of those liabilities. We also reported four ICAs in the quarter.

1.2.1 Review of NGO Invoices

We reviewed, validated, and reconciled invoices submitted by NGOs acting as Service Providers (SPs) to the COVID-19 Emergency Response and Health Systems Preparedness Project (COVID-19 ERHSPP), and by the NGO Facilitating Partners (FPs) for the Citizens' Charter Afghanistan Project (CCAP), Relief Activities for Afghan Communities and Household Project (REACH), Women's Economic Empowerment Rural Development Project (WEE-RDP), and Eshteghal Zaiee - Karmondana (EZ-Kar) projects, with the objective of issuing Cover Letters ('Certificates') confirming whether the amounts invoiced were accurate and, if not, recommending a certified amount for payment. The reviews were conducted in accordance with procedures agreed with the World Bank. We issued 96 Cover Letters certifying 82% (\$38.90 million) of the amounts invoiced. The reviews are further discussed in Section 2.1.

1.2.2 Statements of Expenditure

We assisted the Bank in documenting projects' final expenditure to 15 August 2021 by reviewing their Statements of Expenditure (SoEs) to evaluate whether the expenditure stated by the projects in the SoEs, documented in the Withdrawal Application, was being reported in accordance with the Grant or Financing Agreement. This process is a supplemental control measure introduced by the World Bank uniquely in Afghanistan as one element of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Enhanced Fiduciary Control Framework.

For each SoE, we review project procurement, payroll, and project implementation and management expenditure. We conduct sample-based substantive testing of transactions through multiple rounds of review, requests for documentation or follow-up clarifications, and identification and reporting of 'Questionable Transactions', that is, financial errors impacting the expenditure reported. After each review, we submit SoE Cover Letters outlining findings and their impact on the amounts claimed for documentation.

Questionable Transactions primarily arise from:

- Missing supporting documentation
- Non-compliance with applicable procurement regulations
- Overdue advances claimed as expenditure
- Non-compliance with financial policies
- Accounting/casting errors
- Overpayments to contractors and employees

To minimize the risk of ineligible expenditure, payments identified as Questionable Transactions are withheld until issues are resolved and missing documentation provided.

In Q1, we issued 14 SoE Cover Letters relating to project closures, reporting expenditure of \$14.92 million, proposing adjustments for Questionable Transactions amounting to \$196,351. Our SoE reviews are further discussed in Section 2.2.

1.2.3 Internal Control Assessments

ICAs evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of investment projects' governance, risk management, and control processes intended to ensure the effective management of ARTF and International Development Association (IDA) project funds. They include, but are not limited to, reviews of significant processes related to financial management, procurement, recruitment, Human Resource Management, and the governance and control environment.

The four assessments that were reported in the quarter are shown below. Delays in reporting arose from the time taken to recover working papers left in PIU offices after mid-August 2021.

Table 2: Internal Control Assessments in Q1 2022

PROJECT	STATUS
Eshteghal Zaiee - Karmondena - Kabul Municipality (EZ-Kar-KM)	The full ICA report with management's responses and implementation plan was issued in the quarter.
Afghanistan Gas Project (AGASP)	The ICA reports were issued in the quarter. Our findings had not been discussed and agreed with management, or implementation plan developed by 15 August 2021. Hence, we were only able to report our findings (without management responses or action plan) as of 15 August 2021.
CASA Community Support Project (CASA CSP)	Final report without management feedback issued in March 2022, as our assessment was ongoing on 15 August and could not be completed after then.
Cities Investment Program (CIP)	Final report with management responses issued in March 2022. Although management responded to the majority of our findings and committed to an implementation plan, the change in regime on 15 August 2021, and the World Bank's subsequent decision to terminate the project, have meant that the plan could not be implemented.

The ICAs are further discussed in Section 2.3.

1.3 Limitations

1.3.1 COVID-19

In Q1 2022, we continued to operate under a COVID-19 Contingency Plan shared with the World Bank and reviewed on a regular basis. Under this plan, to reduce the potential for infection involving our own staff or those with whom we came into contact, we continued to replace face-to-face individual and group interviews wherever possible by telephone calls, based on information received from community members and our own local contacts.

1.3.2 Access to Female Respondents

Throughout this period, we only conducted interviews for Economic Sector Monitoring. Our ability to interact with women respondents was constrained by the type of professions of the people interviewed, which are typically male-dominated. This affected the overall percentage of interviews conducted with women, particularly for women who were not bank customers or tailors for women and girls.

The impact of this on our findings relates to the percentage of women we could interview in any one community. While a random sample of women nationwide can, statistically, provide a broad basis for reporting, a much higher sample is required to provide evidence from a specific community or group of communities. The effect of not being able to directly engage with as many women as before makes our findings somewhat less representative in terms of comparing findings between men and women. However, it does not make our findings less representative in terms of reporting community voices overall.

1.3.3 Access to Sites

During Q1 2022, we conducted site visits in 26 out of 34 provinces. We continued to monitor threats and planned our activities in response to emerging security issues, including in hard-to-reach areas.

2 Results from Financial Monitoring

2.1 NGO Invoice Reviews

During Q1 2022, we issued 60 Cover Letters under the CCAP, REACH, EZ-Kar, and WEE-RDP projects, and 36 Cover Letters under the COVID-19 ERHSPP, that were submitted by the NGOs (SPs and FPs) for services provided, certifying 82% (\$38.90 million) of the value of the invoices submitted for payment (i.e., \$47.54 million), as summarized below. The detailed results of our review have been submitted as an Excel attachment to the Bank.

Table 3: Cover Letters Issued in Q1 2022 (USD)

IN US DOLLARS ⁴	INVOICED	CERTIFIED	% CERTIFIED
IDA	\$38,421,057	\$29,504,970	77%
ARTF	\$9,563,324	\$9,405,016	98%
	\$47,984,381	\$38,909,986	81%

IN US DOLLARS	INVOICED	CERTIFIED	% CERTIFIED
COVID-19 ERHSPP	\$22,470,165	\$17,430,571	79%
CCAP	\$12,647,314	\$12,254,116	97%
REACH	\$7,466,616	\$5,067,017	68%
EZ-Kar	\$1,181,265	\$909,109	77%
WEE-RDP	\$4,219,021	\$3,249,173	77%
	\$47,984,381	\$38,909,986	81%

We also reviewed and verified the banking details submitted by the NGOs to assist the World Bank in ensuring that payments are only made to the contracted NGOs.

⁴ Amounts invoiced in Afghani were converted to US Dollars at the exchange rate of AFN 90 per US Dollar.

2.2 Statement of Expenditure Reviews

During Q1 2022, we completed 14 of the 48 outstanding reviews of project expenditure for the closing periods up to 15 August 2021. The results of our Q1 review are summarized in the table below and further detailed in Annex 2.

Table 4: Results of SoE Reviews Conducted in Q1 2022 (USD)

	ARTF	IDA	TOTAL
Expenditure Reported on SoEs	\$8,309,095	\$6,611,478	\$14,920,573
Unresolved Questionable Transactions	(\$167,083)	(\$29,268)	(\$196,351)
Expenditure Recommended for Documentation	\$8,142,012	\$6,582,210	\$14,724,222

We issued 14 SoE Cover Letters for projects that documented expenditures amounting to \$14.92 million and recommended \$14.72 million for documentation on the Withdrawal Applications. The difference (\$196,351) is in respect of the unresolved Questionable Transactions identified in the quarter.

2.2.1 Status of Questionable Transactions

Table 5 summarizes the status of questionable transactions.

Table 5: Status of Unresolved Questionable Transactions as of the end of Q1 2022

	USD
Cumulative Adjustments for Questionable Transactions	\$18,333,024
Resolved	(\$11,979,117)
Unresolved Questionable Transactions	\$6,353,907

By the end of Q1 2022, we had identified \$18.33 million in Questionable Transactions during regular SoE reviews. To minimize the risk of ineligible expenditure, payments identified as Questionable Transactions are withheld until issues are resolved and/or missing documentation provided. The resolved Questionable Transactions amounted to \$11.97 million at the end of Q1 2022, with \$6.35 million requiring further documentation or clarification to be eligible for documentation. The highest value of the unresolved Questionable Transactions reported in submitted SoEs, shown below, account for approximately 74% (\$4.70 million) of this total.

Table 6: Highest Value Unresolved Questionable Transactions as of the end of Q1 2022

PROJECT ID	PROJECT	PERIOD	USD
P160567	CCAP (MRRD) OpEx	Q2 1399	\$1,153,659
P160568	CCAP (IDLG) OpEx	Q3 & Q4 1399	\$1,082,755
P160615	Sehatmandi	Q3 & Q4 1399	\$976,450
P160615	Sehatmandi	Q1 & Q2 1399	\$276,109
P160567	CCAP COVID-19 Relief Grants Lot4	Q2 1400	\$266,466

PROJECT ID	PROJECT	PERIOD	USD
P164762	Afghanistan Land Administration Project (ALASP)	Q3 & Q4 1399	\$252,469
P162022	Herat Electrification Project (HEP)	Q2 1399	\$197,914
P160568	CCAP (IDLG) OpEx	Q2 1399	\$194,116
P164443	WEE-RDP	Q4 1399	\$151,406
P160567	CCAP (MRRD) OpEx	Q3 1399	\$149,476
			\$4,700,820

2.3 Internal Control Assessments

The main findings from the four ICAs we completed in Q1 2022 are summarized below.

PROJECT	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
AGASP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bid Opening and Technical Evaluation Committees did not submit Conflict of Interest declarations for two of the five contracts reviewed. Contract Management Plans were not being maintained with the suppliers, contrary to Paragraph 3.2 of Annex XI of the Bank's Procurement Regulations. There was no evidence that assets were physically verified in the years 1398 and 1399, or that assets and inventories were inspected upon delivery. Assets were also not insured, contrary to the provisions of the Finance Manual. The HR Manual had not been developed. For all the eight recruitments that we sampled, the recruitment committees did not submit signed Conflict of Interest declarations. We further found no evidence of a formal induction program in place, and there was no evidence that reference checks and validation of qualifications were being performed.
CASA CSP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Citizens' Charter Management Committees did not hold twice-yearly and minuted meetings, in accordance with the Operations Manual. Project-specific internal audits were not conducted by MRRD, and there was no evidence of a process in place to follow up or track the implementation of audit recommendations. Bank reconciliations and surprise cash counts were not performed, and advances not acquitted within the three-month deadline, in accordance with the Finance Manual. The World Bank's Procurement Regulations were not complied with, and Conflict of Interest declarations were not submitted by Bid Opening and Bid Evaluation Committee members. Unqualified candidates were recruited for four of the ten positions we reviewed. Recruitment longlists, interview forms, and written test results were not subject to adequate independent reviews. Job references were not obtained for three of the sampled positions, and Conflict of Interest declarations were not submitted by recruitment and interviewing panel members. CDC selection was not conducted in accordance with the Financing Agreement.
CIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal audits were not conducted, and there was no evidence of follow-up or tracking of implementation of audit recommendations. Conflict of Interest declarations were not submitted by members of Bid Opening and Bid Evaluation Committees. Annual physical verification of fixed assets was not conducted, and assets were not tagged.⁵

⁵ A finding for this project, as well as for EZ-Kar (IDLG), EZ-Kar-KM, and TAGHIR below, is that assets were not insured. Although required by World Bank, insurance cover was not possible, whether by Government agencies or FPs. Reference to this issue has been removed from other projects in this table.

PROJECT	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
EZ-Kar-KM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="347 271 1428 353">● We noted the absence of HR guidance on the selection of the shortlisting and recruitment interview panels, and no policy requirement on panel members submitting Conflict of Interest declarations. Further, some HR policy requirements on recruitment were not complied with. <li data-bbox="347 371 1428 454">● There was no evidence of bank reconciliations and surprise cash counts being performed, internal audits were not conducted regularly by Kabul Municipality, and there was no evidence of follow-up or tracking of implementation of audit recommendations. <li data-bbox="347 465 1428 548">● Conflict of Interest declarations were not submitted by Bid Opening and Bid Evaluation Committee members, and publication of contract awards were not in accordance with Procurement Guidelines. <li data-bbox="347 560 994 586">● Physical verification of fixed assets was not conducted. <li data-bbox="347 598 1428 676">● Anti-Corruption Guidelines were not provided to staff, consultants, and contractors, and the Economic Infrastructure Unit (needed to identify the project’s investment priority areas and beneficiaries) had not been established.

3 Results from Economic Sector Monitoring

Following the collapse of the Government in August 2021, we were tasked by the World Bank to monitor a number of key economic indicators:

- Prices and availability of food and non-food items combined into a Consumer Price Index basket as defined by the World Bank, and the extent to which shopkeepers selling these items were paying taxes and relied on cashless transactions
- Banking sector activities, including both formal banking activities and activities of informal currency exchange traders and Hawala operators
- Transport flows at major border crossings
- Labor market activities, including nominal wages and availability of casual workers, as well as the extent to which salary payments of civil servants were being made.

We collected this information by conducting short surveys at markets and banks with shopkeepers, bank branch managers, bank clients, skilled and unskilled daily workers, and Hawala operators. Physical data collection also took place at border crossings through observations and interviews with truck drivers and phone interviews with telecom operators and civil servants.

Data were collected from mid-November 2021 in 50 districts in 22 provinces, covering Afghanistan's six largest urban centers and 16 smaller ones. Data were shared with the World Bank on a weekly basis through the Digital Platform, with analysis also visualized through a Power BI dashboard. In addition, during weekly meetings, we provided extensive 'live updates' from Afghanistan on topics such as exchange rate movements and new directives from Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB).

We continued to revise and refine data collection tools in partnership with the World Bank. For Economic Sector Monitoring, we adjusted the tools on Hawalas and Mobile Money Operators.⁶ We also drafted a new tool and began collecting data on civil servant salaries to establish whether public sector employees were receiving their salaries or whether they were relying on alternative income sources.

In Q1 2022, we conducted 754 site visits to 22 provinces, comprising 624 market visits (including visits to bank branches) and 130 border crossings visits. We conducted a total of 35,127 interviews,⁷ 34,607 on-site

⁶ In the Hawala data collection tool, we added a fixed price rate. In the Mobile Money Operator tool, we changed the coding to shift the order of the questions.

⁷ For Economic Sector Monitoring, we report on the number of interviews conducted and not the number of respondents as many of the respondents were interviewed repeatedly over the reporting period.

interviews and 520 phone interviews. Information about respondents' gender was unavailable for 2% (n=662) of the interviews. Of the 34,465 interviews where this information was available, only 1% (n=226) of interviews were with women, due in part to the nature of the respondents sampled and the additional difficulty engaging with women in current circumstances.

Figure 3 below presents the number of site visits conducted, disaggregated by monitoring activity and province. Figure 4 presents the number of interviews.

Figure 3: Map of Economic Sector Monitoring Site Visits in Q1 2022





Figure 4: Interviews conducted in Q1 2022

Economic Sector Monitoring Interviews in 2022							
Survey Type	Respondent Type	Male	Female	Gender Not Clear	Total Interviews per Respondent Type	Total Interviews per Survey Type	Conducted On-Site or by Phone?
Bank	Bank Branch Manager	644	3		647	3,817	On-Site
	Bank Customer	3,085	65	20	3,170		
Bank OP	Shopkeeper next to the Bank	447	-		447	1,330	On-Site
	Bank Security Guard	649	-		649		
	Bank Customer	71	-		71		
	Bank Branch Manager	160	3		163		
Food	General/Grocery Store	1,824	1		1,825	10,166	On-Site
	Shop/Cart/Stall with Vegetables	1,808	-		1,808		
	Shop/Cart/Stall with Fruits	1,793	-		1,793		
	Bakery	1,725	2		1,727		
	Butcher (Shop with Meat)	1,712	-		1,712		
	Dairy Shop	1,292	9		1,301		
MSNFEX	Informal Currency Exchangers and/or Hawala Operators	2,260	3		2,263	2,263	On-Site
Market Service	Shared Taxi/Van/Rickshaw Driver	1,693	-		1,693	9,953	On-Site
	Barber	1,688	-		1,688		
	Private Health Facility Staff	1,742	5		1,747		
	Real Estate Agent	1,042	1		1,043		
	Tailors for Men and Boys	1,807	2		1,809		
	Tailors for Women and Girls	1,246	85		1,331		
	Daily Labourers (Group Interviews)		-	642	642		
Non-Food Item Vendors	Firewood Seller (Commonly Used)	1,031	-		1,031	7,078	On-Site
	Petrol Pump/Gas Station Staff/Shopkeeper	1,200	-		1,200		
	Shopkeepers (Fabric) for Women and Girls	1,223	-		1,223		
	Shopkeepers (Fabric) for Men and Boys	1,237	-		1,237		
	Shopkeeper (Stationery)	1,150	-		1,150		
	Shopkeeper (Shoes)	1,237	-		1,237		
Government Employees	Civil Servants	252	15		267	267	Phone
Telecom	Telecom Operator	221	32		253	253	Phone
Total Interviews Conducted		34,239	226	662	35,127	35,127	

3.1.1 Prices and Availability

Dramatic price increases in 2021 gave way to stabilization in early 2022. In Q1, the trends for food and non-food prices differed, with food prices rising gradually and prices of non-food items and services remaining stable on average.

Figure 5: Consumer Price Index Afghanistan



Although there were significant price increases, our findings indicate that key food and non-food items are still regularly available in local markets.

Figure 6: Proportion of Food Items reported to be 'Regularly Available'






Figure 7: Proportion of Non-Food Items reported to be 'Regularly Available'



3.1.2 Cashless Transactions


A small percentage of shopkeepers and vendors interviewed reported that they accepted cashless transactions for food and non-food items. This totaled 3% (n=262) of the 10,172 food item shopkeepers interviewed who responded to this question, and 2% (n=142) of the 7,082 non-food item vendors who responded.

Figure 8: Proportion of Shopkeepers Accepting Cashless Transactions



Most of the 262 shopkeepers that reported accepting cashless transactions stated this was a long-standing practice (81%, n=211), as did three-quarters of the 142 vendors that reported accepting cashless transactions (75%, n=107).


Figure 9: Shopkeepers and Vendors Accepting Cashless Transactions



3.1.3 Taxes


Most shopkeepers and vendors interviewed reported that their taxes had stayed the same since mid-August.

Figure 10: Change in Amount of Taxes Paid Since 15 August 2021



However, tax collection appears to have slowed since then, with only half (n=9,097) of shopkeepers and vendors reporting that they had been taxed in the quarter, compared with almost three-quarters (74%, n=12,774) who said that they were taxed before 15 August 2021.


Figure 11: Proportion of Shopkeepers and Vendors who Reported Paying Taxes



3.1.4 Labor Market


Our data show that both nominal and real wages remained stable during the Q1 2022 reporting period. For this calculation, weekly inflation rate was applied, calculated using the Consumer Price Index data shown in Figure 5 (If we had used monthly or annual inflation with an older base period, real wages would be significantly lower than nominal wages. This was not used for the purposes of this report in order to ensure reliance on our data only).

Figure 12: Nominal and Real Wages (in AFN)




Available employment for daily workers was very low during this reporting period, averaging just under two days of work per week for both skilled and unskilled laborers. This is probably related to the fact that this reporting period falls during winter in Afghanistan.

Figure 13: Demand for Skilled and Unskilled Daily Workers




Of the 267 civil servants interviewed by our call center staff for this quarter, most (93%, n=247) reported that they had been paid in the last six months, with just over two-thirds (69 percent, n=170) reporting that they were paid in line with their original salary.

Figure 14: Civil Servant Salary in Sonbola-Dalwa from 23 August 2021 to 19 February 2022




More than half of the 267 civil servants interviewed (63%, n=167) were aware of changes made by the Taliban administration to the civil service salary structure. More than two-thirds of the those who stated they were aware of these changes reported that their salary had changed as a result (71%, n=118).

Figure 15: Taliban Changes to Civil Servant Salary Structure



Of the 118 (71%) civil servants who reported that their salary had changed due to the Taliban’s revisions to the salary structure, nearly all (97%, n=114) reported a decrease.


Figure 16: Impact of Taliban Changes to the Salary Structure



3.1.5 Exchange Rates


After an initial depreciation, the Afghani (AFN) appreciated against different currencies in the second half of the reporting period, especially in February. This could be associated with news reported at that time of the World Bank Board's support to prepare nearly USD 1 billion for basic services in the country. The World Bank slowed down the preparation of the education project towards the end of the reporting period following the Taliban's reversal on enabling girls' access to education. This decision, and the global response to it, could have been expected to cause the AFN to depreciate against the currencies shown in Figure 17, as well as other currencies. This is currently not the case; we anticipate that any depreciation may show in the next reporting period. In addition, reasons that might explain the appreciation of the AFN in Figure 17 might include Taliban restrictions on money exchange agents from increasing the USD exchange rate against the AFN, and the auctioning of humanitarian cash assistance to inject foreign currency into the local market and stabilize the AFN.

Figure 17: Exchange Rate - Index Week 52 December 2021 (Higher = Depreciation)



Approximately two-thirds of informal currency traders in Pakistani Rupees (67%, 603 of 1,436) and US Dollars (61%, 881 of 1,444) reported that there was sufficient availability of each currency in the market. In the case of Iranian Tomans, fewer than half of the traders (42%, 603 of 1,436) said there was enough currency available, while less than one-third of traders in United Arab Emirates Dirhams (29%, 419 of 1,445) said this was the case.

Figure 18: Availability of Foreign Currency




3.1.6 Banking

In this reporting period, we visited 800 branches of 11 banks across the country.⁸ Of these, nearly all were open (95%, n=758), with 647 banks (81% of the bank branches visited) open and consenting to give interviews. On average, only a few open bank branches visited had a functioning ATM (5%).


⁸ Afghan United Bank, Afghanistan International Bank, Azizi Bank, Bank Alfalah Ltd, Bank Millie Afghan, First Micro Finance Bank, Ghazanfar Bank, Islamic Bank of Afghanistan, Maiwand Bank, New Kabul Bank, and Pashtany Bank.

Figure 19: Banking Operationality



At the beginning of Q1 2022, more bank branch managers than in the previous reporting period were reporting that the number of withdrawals had remained the same. By the end of the reporting period, however, a slightly higher proportion of managers were reporting a higher number of withdrawals.

Figure 20: Banking Withdrawal Changes as reported by Bank Branch Managers



On average, the withdrawal limits reported by bank branch managers were lower than those set by DAB, affecting both individual and corporate accounts, regardless of whether the withdrawals were being made in USD or AFN. A number of branch managers appeared to be imposing lower withdrawal limits because of local liquidity concerns. The difference between limits set by bank branch managers and DAB decreased for individual account holders in January and appeared to stabilize after that. However, for corporate account holders, the difference gradually increased, suggesting mounting liquidity concerns for all branches.


Figure 21: Monthly Withdrawal Limits for Individuals and Businesses (in AFN and USD)



3.1.7 Hawala


By the end of the Q1 2022 period, 43% of Hawala operators (427 of 986) were reporting a decrease in outgoing domestic transactions, and 44% (274 of 626) a decrease in outgoing international transactions. At the same time, 36% of Hawala operators (n=352) were reporting that transactions had stayed the same in relation to outgoing domestic transactions, and 35% (n=221) that transactions had stayed the same in relation to outgoing international ones.

Figure 22: Changes in Outgoing Domestic and International Transactions as reported by Hawala Operators



According to Hawala operators, the top three domestic destinations for sending money were Kabul, Herat, and Balkh. The top three international destinations for sending money were Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.

Figure 23: Common Domestic and International Destinations for Hawala Operators



4 Refining our Approach

Since the fall of the Afghan Government on 15 August 2021, we have worked with World Bank Contract Managers, Practice Groups, and project task teams to identify and plan to address critical information gaps, building on our continuing in-country presence and ability to continue conducting data collection.

4.1 Adapting our Methodology and Approach

We continued discussions with the World Bank to identify the Bank's principal information requirements in the absence of being able to obtain regular data through Government channels. As a result, we continued sector monitoring of key economic indicators throughout the quarter and identified new monitoring needs for infrastructure projects in Q1 and Q2.

We will continue to engage with the World Bank over future monitoring needs throughout 2022.

4.2 Stakeholder Engagement

In Q1 2022, we continued a standard quarterly report feedback process which involves obtaining feedback from each World Bank task team on reports issued. We conducted sessions with task teams and on previously issued reports, providing an opportunity to explore useful findings, identify information gaps, and review deviations found.

4.3 Improvements to the Digital Platform

In Q1 2022, our Digital Platform Unit continued to respond to World Bank's requests and provide World Bank teams with data held there. During this period, while no formal training sessions were held, our staff conducted Platform overviews and demonstrated its capabilities to a number of UN agencies in preparation for new monitoring activities. In addition, we deployed reporting systems for new sector monitoring and added sector visits as a new component, providing users with access to view and export general information about sector visits. We also introduced new reporting types to align with World Bank requirements, including data collection images, updates, and tools.

Annex 1: Infrastructure Scoring and Rating

Initial Scoring and Rating

Our starting point for scoring and grading sites or sub-projects is our engineer’s observations, reinforced by documentary evidence (including photographs), and further evidenced by survey responses from local project staff, contractors and technical personnel, laborers, male and female CDC office-bearers, and other community leaders and members.

Our engineers then produce a score for different infrastructure elements: Design, Materials, Workmanship, and the Operations and Maintenance Plan where applicable, based on the zero to five scoring model outlined below.

DEFINITION	INITIAL SCORE	INITIAL RATING
Design		
The design was created with full consideration of the site requirements. The design is fully appropriate and allows for 100% of intended functionality and design life.	5	Very Good
The design responds to almost all site requirements; however, small considerations could have reduced wear and tear and lowered maintenance requirements. Intended functionality is between 90% and 100% and design life is not impacted.	4.0 - 4.9	Good
The design responds only to the major requirements of the site. Some of the design may be inappropriate or missing important elements, causing the sub-project to have between 70% and 90% of intended functionality and a shorter design life.	3.0 - 3.9	Average
The design does not respond to all major requirements of the site. Much of the design may be inappropriate or missing important elements, severely lowering functionality to between 40% and 70%. Sustainability is negatively impacted, and the sub-project will require more maintenance than otherwise would be necessary.	2.0 - 2.9	Below Average
The design responds only to a minority of the major requirements of the site. The design may be largely inappropriate or missing important elements, making the sub-project unsustainable and non-functional in a number of identifiable areas (between 10 and 40%). Portions of the design may have not been feasibly implemented.	1.0 - 1.9	Poor
The design does not consider any of the major requirements of the site. The design is inappropriate, making the sub-project unsustainable and non-functional (below 10%). Identified deficiencies cannot be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe and may not be capable of rectification.	0.0 - 0.9	Very Poor

DEFINITION	INITIAL SCORE	INITIAL RATING
Materials		
The materials used meet all the technical specifications and exceed them in some areas.	5	Very Good
The materials used meet all the technical specifications.	4.0 - 4.9	Good
The materials used meet the major specifications, with some evident deficiencies that can be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe.	3.0 - 3.9	Average
The materials used deviate from the technical specifications, with a number of evident deficiencies that can be remedied but are likely to affect the sub-project budget or timeframe.	2.0 - 2.9	Below Average
Many of the materials used deviate from the technical specifications, with many evident deficiencies that cannot be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe.	1.0 - 1.9	Poor
All, or almost all of the materials used deviate from the technical specifications requiring serious reworking, up to and including complete replacement. Identified deficiencies cannot be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe and may not be capable of rectification.	0.0 - 0.9	Very Poor
Workmanship		
The quality of workmanship meets all the technical specifications and exceeds them in some areas.	5	Very Good
The quality of workmanship meets all the technical specifications.	4.0 - 4.9	Good
The quality of workmanship meets the major specifications, with some evident deficiencies that can be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe.	3.0 - 3.9	Average
The quality of workmanship meets the technical specifications, with a number of evident deficiencies that can be remedied but are likely to affect the sub-project budget or timeframe.	2.0 - 2.9	Below Average
The workmanship quality deviates significantly from the technical specifications, with many evident deficiencies that cannot be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe.	1.0 - 1.9	Poor
In all, or almost all cases, the quality of workmanship deviates from the technical specifications requiring serious reworking, up to and including complete replacement. Identified deficiencies cannot be remedied without affecting the sub-project budget or timeframe and may not be capable of rectification.	0.0 - 0.9	Very Poor
Operations and Maintenance (applicable to Completed sub-projects)		
The O&M Plan is fully funded and being implemented. It meets all the requirements of the site or sub-project, exceeds it in some identifiable areas, and is expected to be sustainable over the entire design life of the sub-project.	5	Very Good
The O&M Plan meets all the requirements of the site or sub-project and fully funded. If not already being implemented, it is expected to be fully funded and to be sustainable over the entire design life.	4.0 - 4.9	Good
The O&M Plan meets the major requirements of the site or sub-project. The majority of funds needed are in place to support implementation.	3.0 - 3.9	Average
The O&M Plan meets some but not all of the major requirements of the site or sub-project. A minority of the funds needed to support implementation are in place. If not already being implemented the Plan is not expected to be fully funded.	2.0 - 2.9	Below Average
The O&M Plan meets very few of the major requirements of the site or sub-project.	1.0 - 1.9	Poor
The O&M Plan does not support or is likely to fail to support the sustainability of the site or sub-project.	0.0 - 0.9	Very Poor

Deviation Definitions

Quality Assurance Engineers from the Physical Monitoring team and an engineer from the Analysis and Reporting Team review the deviations identified by the engineers, assigning a classification of either Notification, Minor, Major, or Critical.

CATEGORIES	DEFINITION
Critical	<p>Failure to construct infrastructure in a way that protects workers or community members during construction and requiring urgent mitigation before work can continue.</p> <p>For completed infrastructure, failure to construct infrastructure in a way that protects community members or users.</p> <p>A non-recoverable negative impact in terms of structural quality, functionality or sustainability.</p>
Major	<p>Capable of being rectified but not within existing budget and/or timeframe for completion.</p> <p>A significant negative impact in terms of overall structural quality, functionality and/or sustainability.</p> <p>Not capable of being rectified and resulting in agreed budget and timeframe for completion being exceeded.</p>
Minor	<p>Capable of being rectified within existing budget and/or timeframe for completion.</p> <p>No significant negative impact in terms of overall structural quality, functionality and/or sustainability.</p> <p>Not capable of being rectified but no negative effect on agreed budget and timeframe for completion.</p>
Notification	<p>Minor deviations identified with an estimated rectification cost of under USD 50 are treated as Notifications, listed and supplied to the Government project team for resolution.</p>

Scoring and Final Rating

The score that we apply to a sub-project depends on the number and type of deviations identified by the engineers. For example, a sub-project with a score of 3.5 with no Critical deviations would be graded as Good. If, however, it had more than two Major deviations, it would be downgraded to Average.

We determine a final sub-project rating by considering the number and nature of deviations identified, making allowances for instances of Good Practice and Extra Work. Project-level ratings are the average of final ratings for all of a project's sub-projects monitored in that period.

SCORE	DEVIATIONS	FINAL RATING
5.00	No deviations	Very Good
	Not more than 4 Minor deviations	Good
3.00-4.99	No Critical deviations	Good
	1 Critical deviation	Below Average
	More than 1 Critical deviation	Poor
	Not more than 2 Major deviations	Good
	Not more than 5 Major deviations	Average
	More than 5 Major deviations	Below Average
	Not more than 4 Minor deviations	Good

SCORE	DEVIATIONS	FINAL RATING
	Not more than 10 Minor deviations	Average
	More than 10 Minor deviations	Below Average
2.00-2.99	No Critical deviations	Below Average
	1 Critical deviation	Poor
	More than 1 Critical deviation	Very Poor
	Not more than 2 Major deviations	Below Average
	More than 2 Major deviations	Poor
	Not more than 4 Minor deviations	Below Average
	More than 4 Minor deviations	Poor
0.00-1.99	Not more than 1 Critical deviation, not more than 5 Major deviations, or not more than 10 Minor deviations	Poor
	More than 1 Critical deviation, more than 5 Major deviations, or more than 10 Minor deviations	Very Poor

Annex 2: Statements of Expenditure Issued in Q1 2022

PROJECT ID	PROJECT	PERIOD	TOTAL	ADJUSTMENTS	REVERSAL OF PREVIOUS QUARTER SOE	REPLENISHMENT (USD)
P164762	ALASP	Q3 1400	583,367	-	-	\$583,368
P149410	CASA CSP (Grants)	Q3 1400	807,295	(259)	-	\$807,036
P149410	CASA CSP (Covid Relief Grant) Lot 3	Q3 1400	145,391	(24,968)	-	\$120,423
P160567	CCAP (MRRD) COVID-19 Relief Grants Lot 6	Q3 1400	777,886	(57,288)	-	\$720,598
P160619	CIP	Q3 1400	1,292,787	(384)	-	\$1,292,403
P174348	Emergency Agriculture and Food Supply Project (EATS)	Q3 1400	1,466,965	-	-	\$1,466,965
P159378	EQRA (MRRD) CDC Grant-10	Q3 1400	1,228,771	(5,133)	-	\$1,223,638
P159378	EQRA (MRRD) OpEx	Q2 1400	439,005	-	-	\$439,005
P166127	EZ-Kar (IDLG) Component 2	Q3 1400	1,732,890	-	-	\$1,732,890
P162022	HEP	Q3 1400	2,181,230	-	-	\$2,181,230
P166978	TAGHIR	Q3 1400	1,871,090	-	-	\$1,871,090
P164443	WEE-RDP	Q1-Q2 1400	2,018,553	(108,319)	-	\$1,910,233
P174119	REACH-MRRD (OPEX)	Q1-Q2 1400	173,025	-	-	\$173,025
P174119	REACH-MRRD (OPEX)	Q3 1400	202,318	-	-	\$202,318
			14,920,573	196,351	-	\$14,724,222

Annex 3: NGO Invoice Review - COVID-19 ERHSPP

	SERVICE PROVIDER	PROVINCE	AMOUNT INVOICED (USD)	AMOUNT CERTIFIED (USD)	CERTIFIED AS % OF INVOICED AMOUNT
1	AKF	Badakhshan	\$588,167	\$481,614	82%
2	MMRCA (National)	Badghis	\$334,596	\$333,781	100%
3	BDN	Baghlan	\$668,631	\$298,845	45%
4	BDN	Balkh	\$900,345	\$599,806	67%
5	AKF	Bamyan	\$442,001	\$391,391	89%
6	MOVE	Daikundi	\$470,412	\$448,678	95%
7	MRCA	Farah	\$299,333	\$137,264	46%
8	SDO	Faryab	\$237,531	\$128,565	54%
9	AADA	Ghazni	\$869,306	\$857,553	99%
10	CHA	Ghor	\$546,215	\$317,637	58%
11	BRAC	Helmand	\$339,864	\$296,555	87%
12	AADA	Herat	\$2,354,267	\$2,344,739	100%
13	SAF	Jawzjan	\$456,465	\$343,590	75%
14	SDO	Kabul	\$221,471	\$190,358	86%
15	CAF	Kabul (AJH)	\$830,504	\$240,646	29%
16	HN-TPO	Kabul (AJH)	\$800,205	\$593,418	74%
17	BARAN	Kandahar	\$1,135,596	\$952,365	84%
18	OHPM	Khost	\$553,406	\$400,081	72%
19	HN-TPO/ ORCD	Konar	\$433,330	\$386,758	89%
20	JACK	Kunduz	\$910,332	\$881,450	97%
21	HN-TPO	Laghman	\$483,639	\$344,935	71%
22	CAF	Logar	\$415,736	\$240,512	58%
23	AADA	Nangarhar	\$848,653	\$799,257	94%
24	MRCA	Nimroz	\$156,281	\$133,107	85%
25	AHEAD	Nooristan	\$206,939	\$159,911	77%
26	HEWAD/ NAC	Paktia	\$267,045	\$259,273	97%
27	OHPM	Paktika	\$491,572	\$416,360	85%
28	SCA	Parwan, Kapisa, Panjshir	\$1,215,823	\$428,895	35%
29	AHEAD	Samangan	\$664,663	\$445,323	67%
30	SAF	Sar-e-Pol	\$304,130	\$246,181	81%
31	BDN	Takhar	\$502,424	\$407,004	81%
32	SHDP	Urozgan	\$76,303	\$60,785	80%
33	SCA	Wardak	\$562,470	\$277,753	49%
34	AADA	Zabul	\$610,081	\$607,179	100%
35	COVID-19 TPM		\$601,979	\$545,891	91%
36	WHO		\$1,670,450	\$1,433,111	86%
	Total USD		\$22,470,165	\$17,430,571	78%

Annex 4: NGO Invoice Review - CCAP, REACH, EZ-KAR, WEE-RDP

SN	FACILITATING PARTNER	PROJECT	AMOUNT INVOICED BY FPS (USD)	AMOUNT CERTIFIED BY TPMA (USD)	CERTIFIED AS % OF INVOICED AMOUNT
1	ACTED	CCAP/IDLG	\$74,885	\$74,885	100%
2	ACTED	CCAP/IDLG	\$115,037	\$68,329	59%
3	ACTED	CCAP/MRRD	\$459,195	\$459,195	100%
4	ACTED	CCAP/MRRD	\$640,167	\$640,167	100%
5	ACTED	EZ-KAR/IDLG	\$64,865	\$57,633	89%
6	ACTED	EZ-KAR /IDLG	\$91,935	\$71,379	78%
7	ACTED	REACH/IDLG	\$59,763	\$59,763	100%
8	ACTED	REACH/IDLG	\$537,871	\$358,580	67%
9	ACTED	REACH/MRRD	\$62,975	\$62,975	100%
10	ACTED	REACH/MRRD	\$147,752	\$147,752	100%
11	ACTED	REACH/IDLG	\$110,581	\$98,294	89%
12	ADA	WEE-RDP/MRRD	\$232,503	\$112,246	48%
13	ADA	REACH/KM	\$951,449	\$455,875	48%
14	Afghanaid	CCAP/MRRD	\$834,613	\$834,613	100%
15	AHDS	CCAP/MRRD	\$312,203	\$309,946	99%
16	AKDN	CCAP/MRRD	\$945,687	\$926,345	98%
17	AKDN	CCAP/MRRD	\$1,244,763	\$1,244,763	100%
18	AKDN	CCAP/MRRD	\$982,400	\$982,400	100%
19	AKF	REACH/MRRD	\$624,440	\$580,355	93%
20	AKF	REACH/MRRD	\$267,400	\$255,360	95%
21	AKF	REACH/MRRD	\$76,154	\$76,154	100%
22	AKF	REACH/IDLG	\$53,442	\$53,442	100%
23	AKF	WEE-RDP/MRRD	\$375,905	\$350,341	93%
24	ANRCC	EZ-KAR/IDLG	\$418,387	\$408,683	98%
25	BRAC	CCAP/MRRD	\$872,410	\$872,410	100%
26	BRAC	REACH/IDLG	\$211,020	\$211,020	100%
27	BWHC	WEE-RDP/MRRD	\$552,936	\$414,304	75%

SN	FACILITATING PARTNER	PROJECT	AMOUNT INVOICED BY FPS (USD)	AMOUNT CERTIFIED BY TPMA (USD)	CERTIFIED AS % OF INVOICED AMOUNT
28	CARE	CCAP/MRRD	\$1,762,424	\$1,746,152	99%
29	CHA	CCAP/IDLG	\$140,111	\$110,258	79%
30	CHA	CCAP/MRRD	\$1,730,433	\$1,681,041	97%
31	CHA	CCAP/MRRD	\$241,673	\$241,673	100%
32	CHA	REACH/MRRD	\$322,165	\$287,464	89%
33	CHA	REACH/IDLG	\$435,159	\$286,760	66%
34	CHA	REACH/MRRD	\$85,874	\$85,874	100%
35	CHA	REACH/MRRD	\$148,323	\$121,057	82%
36	CHA	WEE-RDP/MRRD	\$788,548	\$580,971	74%
37	CoAR	EZ-KAR/IDLG	\$363,630	\$161,816	45%
38	CoAR	WEE-RDP/MRRD	\$1,086,334	\$745,702	69%
39	CoAR	REACH/KM	\$1,114,082	\$556,777	50%
40	DACAAR	CCAP/MRRD	\$457,595	\$438,727	96%
41	DACAAR	REACH/MRRD	\$236,033	\$202,938	86%
42	DSK	CCAP/IDLG	\$179,503	\$60,078	33%
43	EPD	CCAP/IDLG	\$78,994	\$31,585	40%
44	FGA	CCAP/IDLG	\$211,317	\$208,315	99%
45	FGA	CCAP/IDLG	\$150,084	\$146,869	98%
46	FGA	WEE-RDP/MRRD	\$1,182,795	\$1,045,609	88%
47	HRDA	CCAP/IDLG	\$285,479	\$285,479	100%
48	HRDA	CCAP/IDLG	\$298,886	\$298,662	100%
49	HRDA	REACH/IDLG	\$276,929	\$240,808	87%
50	NPO/ RRAA	CCAP/MRRD	\$449,305	\$449,305	100%
51	NPO/ RRAA	REACH/MRRD	\$14,070	\$14,070	100%
52	NPO/ RRAA	REACH/MRRD	\$49,295	\$49,295	100%
53	ORCD	EZ-KAR/IDLG	\$149,318	\$120,813	81%
54	ORCD	REACH/IDLG	\$140,906	\$123,038	87%
55	SDO	EZ-KAR/IDLG	\$93,130	\$88,785	95%
56	SDO	REACH/MRRD	\$19,159	\$16,410	86%
57	SDO	REACH/KM	\$745,390	\$364,860	49%
58	TAF	CCAP/MRRD	\$68,456	\$68,456	100%
59	WADAN	REACH/KM	\$776,386	\$358,097	46%
60	RRAA	CCAP/IDLG	\$111,692	\$74,462	67%
TOTAL			\$25,514,216	\$21,479,415	84%

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